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Lund: Bush v. Gore at the Dawning of the Age of Obama

BUSH V. GORE AT THE DAWNING OF THE AGE OF OBAMA
Nelson Lund*
INTRODUCTION
As Akhil Amar reminds us, hundreds of law professors denounced the
Bush v. Gore majority as propagandists who suppressed the facts and used
their power “to act as political partisans, not judges of a court of law”; as
he also notes, a few other law professors leveled similar judgments against
the Florida judges whose decision triggered the U.S. Supreme Court’s
review.1 Professor Amar does not openly endorse the most venomous
accusations leveled against the Bush v. Gore majority, but he does attempt
to show that the actions of the Florida judges “in general were legally
defensible, and often quite admirable.”2 He also maintains that “the U.S.
Supremes,” as he repeatedly calls them, had no legal basis for their
decision and that three of them strategically joined an opinion that even
they probably regarded as “implausible.”3
If one knew only what Professor Amar tells us, it would be hard to
resist the conclusions reached by two vitriolic professors whom he quotes
at length: “[F]ive Republican members of the Court decided the case in a
way that is recognizably nothing more than a naked expression of these
justices’ preference for the Republican Party . . . [T]he court gave no
legally valid reason for [its] act of usurpation.”4
Fortunately, the legal professoriate is not an Athenian jury, with the
power to ostracize disfavored officials. These pundits are but selfappointed prosecutors in the court of public opinion. In that court, as
Professor Amar says, “Facts matter.”5 Or at least they should. And when
one looks at the facts, Professor Amar’s legal case collapses.
In the space allotted for my response, I will discuss a few of the most
significant omissions, errors, and rhetorical misdirections in Professor
Amar’s passionate assault on the Supreme Court.6 Nothing I say in this
* Patrick Henry Professor of Constitutional Law and the Second Amendment, George
Mason University School of Law. George Mason provided research support, a portion of which
came through its Law & Economics Center. For helpful comments, I am grateful to Stephen G.
Gilles, Mara S. Lund, and John O. McGinnis.
1. Akhil Reed Amar, Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution, 61 FLA. L. REV. 945, 947–
50 (2009).
2. Id. at 955.
3. Id. at 966.
4. Id. at 947–48 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin and Bruce Ackerman, respectively).
5. Id. at 963.
6. More extensive treatments of the issues discussed in this response are available in Nelson
Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219 (2002) [hereinafter
Unbearable Rightness]; Nelson Lund, “Equal Protection, My Ass!?” Bush v. Gore and Laurence
Tribe’s Hall of Mirrors, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 543 (2002) [hereinafter Hall of Mirrors]; Nelson
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response is novel—it has all been on the public record for many years.
SOME OMITTED FACTS ABOUT THE CASE
Before considering Professor Amar’s argument, the reader needs an
accurate summary of the Court’s decision. Based on two separate machine
counts of the Florida ballots, George Bush narrowly won that state’s
electoral votes.7 Al Gore demanded hand recounts in a few heavily
Democratic counties, where he could expect to pick up votes as the result
of the random errors that inevitably occur whenever large numbers of
ballots are counted.8 State statutes created obstacles to this strategy, but the
Florida Supreme Court swept those obstacles aside, apparently relying on
Florida constitutional law.9 In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board,10 the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously vacated that decision, and
warned the Florida judges that their decision seemed to conflict with
McPherson v. Blacker,11 which had interpreted Article II of the U.S.
Constitution to preclude state constitutions from abridging the discretion of
state legislatures to specify the manner of choosing presidential electors.12
The Florida Supreme Court ignored this warning. By a vote of four to
three, these judges ratified Gore’s cherry-picking strategy, created more
time for recounts to be conducted, and definitively awarded Gore a number
of additional votes from the counties he had selected.13 This included
additional votes based on a partial recount in Miami-Dade County that had
begun with heavily Democratic precincts and stopped before it reached the
more Republican precincts.14 The Florida Supreme Court also ordered a
recount of some additional ballots in Miami-Dade County, but only the socalled undervote ballots that Gore wanted to have recounted.15 The Florida
Supreme Court also ordered a state-wide hand recount (which Gore had
not requested), but not a recount of all the ballots, or even a recount of all
the ballots that had been rejected as invalid in the initial machine counts;
Lund, Carnival of Mirrors: Laurence Tribe’s “Unbearable Wrongness,’ 19 CONST. COMMENT. 609
(2002) [hereinafter Carnival of Mirrors].
7. Lund, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 6, at 1228.
8. Id. at 1228–29.
9. Id. at 1229–33; Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla.
2000).
10. 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
11. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
12. Id. at 25; Bush v. Palm Beach Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76–77.
13. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000); Lund, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 6,
at 1235–37.
14. Lund, Hall of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 554 & n.40; Lund, Unbearable Rightness, supra
note 6, at 1239–40 & n. 68.
15. “Undervotes” are ballots on which the machine detects no vote for a particular office;
“overvotes” are ballots on which the machine detects a vote for more than one candidate, and
therefore does not register any vote for that office. Lund, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 6, at
1241; Lund, Hall of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 546 n.10.
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the only ballots that would be reviewed were those resembling the ballots
Gore asked to have recounted in Miami-Dade County.16 The Florida court,
moreover, provided no standards to be used by the officials charged with
reexamining these selected ballots, and no uniform standard was in fact
adopted.17
In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court held that this partial recount of the
ballots violated the Equal Protection Clause18 as interpreted in a line of
vote-dilution cases beginning with Reynolds v. Sims,19 and remanded the
case to the Florida Supreme Court “for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.”20
THE FIRST EQUAL PROTECTION CANARD
Professor Amar maintains that the initial machine counts, which the
Florida Supreme Court invalidated, were infected with much more serious
“inequalities and inaccuracies and disenfranchisements” than the partial
and selective hand recount at issue in Bush v. Gore.21 Professor Amar
falsely claims, based on an incomplete and misleading quotation from the
Bush v. Gore opinion, that the only problem with the Florida recount was
that “some dimpled chads were being treated as valid votes, others not.”22
Professor Amar may think that the Supreme Court majority was just
“fixating on the small glitches of the recount”23 when it rejected the biased
and partial recount described above. But three out of seven Florida
Supreme Court Justices (all Democrats) thought otherwise.24 You didn’t
need to be a Republican or a Bush supporter to recognize that this kind of
recount had “no foundation in the law of Florida,”25 or to conclude that the
partial recount ordered by the Florida majority “would violate other voters’
[federal] rights to due process and equal protection of the law.”26
Professor Amar claims that these “small glitches” or “picayune
discrepancies” paled in comparison with the unfairness of the initial
machine counts of the ballots.27 And why were these counts unfair? The
16. Lund, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 6, at 1237; Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 101
(2000).
17. For more details about the facts and rulings summarized in this paragraph and the
preceding paragraph, see Lund, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 6, at 1235–43; Lund, Hall of
Mirrors, supra note 6, at 548–56; Lund, Carnival of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 612–13.
18. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 103.
19. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
20. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111.
21. Amar, supra note 1, at 961–63.
22. Amar, supra note 1, at 961.
23. Amar, supra note 1, at 964.
24. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).
25. Id. at 1263 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 1272 (Harding, J., dissenting).
27. Amar, supra note 1, at 964.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 5 [2009], Art. 5

1004

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

only specific problem he identifies is that “black precincts in 2000
typically had much glitchier voting machines, which generated undercounts
many times the rate of wealthier (white) precincts with sleek voting
technology.”28 His only evidence is a citation to an essay written by one of
Gore’s lawyers after he lost his case, which offers a mere assertion that was
never tested through the adversarial process.29 Even assuming that
Professor Amar’s vague and unproven allegation is true, is he right to say
that the Supreme Court “piously attribut[ed] the problems to ‘voter error’
(as opposed to outdated and seriously flawed machines)”?30 Why couldn’t
one just as easily maintain that Professor Amar piously blames the
machines for (certain) voters’ failure to follow the instructions? Justice
O’Connor made such a suggestion at oral argument: “Well, why isn’t the
[appropriate] standard the one that voters are instructed to follow, for
goodness sakes? I mean, it couldn’t be clearer . . . .”31
Let us leave aside the obvious differences between discrepancies that
inevitably arise in a decentralized election system like Florida’s and those
resulting from a recount system devised after the winner of the initial
machine counts has been determined.32 Even on the far-fetched assumption
that there was more “unfairness” or “inequality” in the initial machine
counts than in the challenged recount, how could the Supreme Court have
known about it? Vice President Gore made no such allegation in his
lawsuit.33 No evidence of such inequality was presented to the trial court,
or to any of the appellate courts that reviewed the case. None of the
dissenting Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court made any such claim.34 Was
28. Id. at 964. Such a racially disparate impact, assuming that it actually existed, has no
apparent legal significance. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (rejecting
disparate impact analysis under the Equal Protection Clause). Cf. Amar, supra note 1, at 969
(expressing concern about the disenfranchisement of felons, “who are disproportionately persons of
color”); Michael D. Goldhaber, The Felon Vote: Millions of Prisoners and Ex-Cons Have Lost the
Ballot, but Suits Could Change That, 23 NAT’L L.J., Oct. 30, 2000, at A1 (discussing study
estimating that 70% to 90% of enfranchised felons would vote Democratic).
29. Amar, supra note 1, at 964 n.61. For an illuminating example of the importance of testing
factual allegations through the adversarial process, taken from the Bush v. Gore litigation itself, see
the devastating cross-examination of a Yale professor, Nicholas Hengartner, who served as one of
Gore’s expert witnesses. Contest Trial Transcript, Vol. II, at 192–230, 233–74, Gore v. Harris, 772
So. 2d 1243 (Fla. Leon County Ct. 2000) (No. 00-2808), available at
http://election2000.stanford.edu/CV-00-2808-33.pdf.
30. Amar, supra note 1, at 964.
31. Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949),
available at 2000 WL 1804429.
32. For further discussion, see Lund, Hall of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 552–62; Lund,
Unbearable Rightness, supra note 6, at 1235–36, 1268. Professor Amar also suggests that Bush v.
Gore made the preposterous assumption that “the Constitution requires absolute perfection and
uniformity of standards in counting and/or recounting.” Amar, supra note 1, at 962. The Court did
no such thing. See Lund, Carnival of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 611–12.
33. Lund, Carnival of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 613 & n.23.
34. For further detail, see id.; Lund, Hall of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 559.
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the Supreme Court really expected (or even permitted) to take judicial
notice of facts that were not argued or proved, and that Professor Amar
himself has not tried to prove nine years later? On this critical point,
Professor Amar’s case against Bush v. Gore does not simply dissolve, it
boomerangs.
THE SECOND EQUAL PROTECTION CANARD
Professor Amar also maintains that the Supreme Court “failed to cite a
single case that, on its facts, came close to supporting the majority’s
analysis and result.”35 It is true that there were no previous cases with
similar facts. How could there have been? No legislature or court had ever
devised a way of counting votes that remotely resembled the arbitrary and
biased procedures adopted by the Florida Supreme Court.
Bush v. Gore’s equal protection holding was in fact supported by a
large body of well-established precedent, beginning with Reynolds v.
Sims,36 where the Court clearly stated: “Weighting the votes of citizens
differently, by any method or means, merely because of where they happen
to reside, hardly seems justifiable. One must be ever aware that the
Constitution forbids ‘sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of
discrimination.’”37 The Florida Supreme Court devised an extremely
complex system of weighting, in which certain kinds of ballots were more
likely to be counted as legal votes in some places than in others, thus
discriminating for and against different groups of voters based on where
they happened to reside.38
Most obviously, voters who cast “overvote” ballots in the heavily
Democratic counties Gore selected for recounts were treated more
favorably than those who cast similar ballots elsewhere.39 Similarly, voters
living in the un-recounted (and more Republican) precincts of Miami-Dade
were disadvantaged in comparison with those living in the recounted (and
more Democratic) precincts.40 The complexity of the vote dilution
involved did not convert it into something other than vote dilution.
Not a single one of the dissenters in Bush v. Gore argued that the
Florida recount comported with the Court’s equal protection precedents,41
and Professor Amar understandably does not try to do so either. Better just
to hope the reader will accept on faith the accuracy of epithets like “new35. Amar, supra note 1, at 963.
36. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
37. Id. at 563 (emphasis added). For discussions of the case law, see Lund, Hall of Mirrors,
supra note 6, at 548–56; Lund, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 6, at 1244–51.
38. For a detailed discussion, see Lund, Unbearable Rightness, supra, note 6, at 1237–52.
39. See id. at 1241–42.
40. See id. at 1239–40.
41. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123–58 (2000) (separate dissenting opinions of Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ.).
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minted” and “absurdly ad hoc” to describe the Court’s holding.42
THE NARROW HOLDING CANARD
Professor Amar writes: “The Rehnquist Court claimed that its newminted equality principles applied only to judicially supervised state
recounts, and not necessarily to other aspects of the electoral system. But
the Court gave no principled reason for this absurdly ad hoc limitation.”43
This is false. The Court rested its decision on well-established principles
from previous decisions,44 and never said these principles would not apply
in future cases. The Court did say, quite prudently and responsibly, that
“our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem
of equal protection in election processes generally presents many
complexities.”45 This was no more “absurdly ad hoc” than the Court’s
equally prudent decision to limit its consideration in Brown v. Board of
Education46 to the issue of segregation in public education. The Brown
Court did not say that its principles were inapplicable elsewhere, and
neither did Bush v. Gore.47
THE ‘STOP COUNTING’ CANARD
Professor Amar insinuates that “the U.S. Supremes felt they had to stop
the recount altogether, rather than remand once again to judges whom they
had come to view as judicial cheats.”48 Leaving aside the unsubstantiated
charge that some members of the Court viewed the Florida judges as
dishonest, this is a fictionalized report of the Court’s remedial order.
The Supreme Court did remand the case to the Florida judges, and the
Court did leave these judges legally free to conduct a recount conforming
to the principles of Reynolds v. Sims49 and its progeny.50 The only legal bar
to such a recount was the Florida Supreme Court’s own prior
determination that state law required a recount to be concluded by
December 12 (the same day that Bush v. Gore was decided).51 The Florida
Supreme Court would have been free to overturn that determination on
remand.52

42. Amar, supra note 1, at 962.
43. Amar, supra note 1, at 962.
44. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104–10 (majority opinion).
45. Id. at 109.
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. See Lund, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 6, at 1267–69.
48. Amar, supra note 1, at 950.
49. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
50. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111.
51. Id. at 110; Lund, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 6, at 1274–78.
52. See Lund, Carnival of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 614–16; Lund, Unbearable Rightness,
supra note 6, at 1270–78.
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Professor Amar may not recognize this, but Al Gore did. Two of Gore’s
lawyers have publicly acknowledged that Bush v. Gore permitted them to
seek a new recount, and they even stayed up all night on December 12
writing a brief that invited the Florida Supreme Court to conduct one.53
Gore decided to concede the election instead, perhaps because he
recognized what the dissenting judges on the Florida Supreme Court found
obvious: it would have been logistically impossible to conduct such a
recount and provide for meaningful judicial review in the six days
remaining before the federal deadline.54 Whatever Gore’s reason for
conceding, it was not because the Supreme Court had “stopped” the
Florida Supreme Court from conducting a new recount.
THE FIRST ARTICLE II RED HERRING
A substantial part of Professor Amar’s lecture is devoted to attacking
the argument that the Florida Supreme Court violated Article II of the
Constitution, which commands that presidential electors be chosen as state
legislatures (not state courts or state constitutions) may direct.55 The
majority opinion in Bush v. Gore made no reference to this argument, so its
validity vel non has no bearing on the merits of the Court’s decision.
However, it is relevant to Professor Amar’s argument for two reasons.
First, he suggests that three concurring Justices (Republicans all), who
endorsed both this argument and the Court’s equal protection argument,
were engaged in disingenuous strategic voting.56 Second, he argues that the
Florida judges clearly did not violate Article II, and should not even be
suspected of any improper behavior.57
The strategic voting charge against Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas rests on two claims: (1) that these three Justices had previously
adopted an equal protection approach that “ran counter” to the approach in
the Bush v. Gore majority opinion, and (2) that principled originalists must
have had “special problems” with the majority opinion.58 Accordingly, the
Republican trio probably saw the majority opinion they joined as “highly
problematic and implausible.”59
Professor Amar does not provide a single example of an opinion by
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, or Thomas that “ran counter” to the Bush v.
Gore majority opinion, and I know of none.60 Regarding the second claim,
53. See Lund, Carnival of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 615 & n.32.
54. The Electoral College was required to meet on December 18. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). A
somewhat similar recount case—the 2008 Coleman-Franken senatorial contest—took eight months
to resolve.
55. Amar, supra note 1, at 957–60.
56. Amar, supra note 1, at 965–66.
57. Amar, supra note 1, at 953–56.
58. Amar, supra note 1, at 965.
59. Amar, supra note 1, at 966.
60. A related version of Professor Amar’s unsupported accusation is debunked in Lund, Hall

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 5 [2009], Art. 5

1008

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

it is true that there are serious originalist objections to the Court’s
Fourteenth Amendment voting rights jurisprudence, which Justice Harlan
powerfully articulated at the outset.61 But no Supreme Court Justice in our
history has ever advocated the overruling of all cases that rest on
objectionable precedential foundations, especially when none of the
litigants has asked for a precedent to be reconsidered. Not Chief Justice
Rehnquist, not Justice Scalia, not Justice Thomas, not anybody. In order to
find an inconsistency in what these three Justices did in Bush v. Gore, you
have to caricature them.
As to the behavior of the Florida majority, Professor Amar admits it
was “a momentous mistake”62 to ignore the constitutional issue raised by
the Supreme Court in Bush I, but he excuses the mistake on the ground that
time was short and the Florida majority nevertheless “did the right legal
things and for the right legal reasons.”63 How so? According to Professor
Amar, they “intuitively” saw the case in light of a “larger spirit.”64
Let us leave aside the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court declared such
“larger spirits” inapplicable over a century ago, in a case that the Court
unanimously told the Florida judges to consider.65 And let us accept,
arguendo, the radical assumption that appellate judges may properly
“intuit” (or guess at, or stumble on) correct legal conclusions. Even on
these generous assumptions, is Professor Amar right to be so sure that the
Florida majority’s “intuitions” were correct?
In support of these intuitions, he offers his own extended legal analysis,
which he describes as “crisp and cogent.”66 This argument—essentially
replicating a reasonably crisp portion of Justice Ginsburg’s Bush v. Gore
dissent—is that state election statutes are generally taken to mean whatever
state courts interpret them to mean, and that Florida’s legislature has never
said a different presumption should operate when the statutes are applied in
presidential elections.67 The argument is certainly colorable,68 but how
“cogent” is it? Florida’s own Chief Justice (a Democrat) unequivocally
concluded, on the basis of longstanding precedent, that his court’s majority
had violated Article II.69 Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 548–50.
61. See Lund, Carnival of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 610; Lund, Hall of Mirrors, supra note 6,
at 556–61; Lund, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 6, at 1262 & n.142.
62. Amar, supra note 1, at 953.
63. Amar, supra note 1, at 956.
64. Amar, supra note 1, at 956.
65. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76–77 (2000) (discussing
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)).
66. Amar, supra note 1, at 953–55.
67. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 135–43 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
68. See Lund, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 6, at 1233.
69. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1268 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting). Professor
Amar misleadingly reports that Chief Justice Wells “worried aloud about the Article II issue.”
Amar, supra note 1, at 952. He did a lot more than worry aloud.
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concurrence in Bush v. Gore offered detailed arguments in support of that
conclusion.70 Apparently, we are just expected to “intuit” that these
arguments are so obviously wrong that they need not even be addressed.
In a small red herring within the larger red herring of his arguments
about Article II, Professor Amar encourages such intuitions by attacking
Katherine Harris, an elected officeholder whose job required her to
interpret Florida’s election laws.71 Professor Amar claims that she “showed
dubious legal judgment” by participating in Bush’s 2000 election campaign
(though he does not say what law she may have violated), and claims that
her official interpretations of the Florida election statutes “raised a vivid
specter of severe partisanship.”72 They were based, he implies, on
“bureaucratic mumbo jumbo or statutory legalese”73 rather than a “deep
constitutional principle” that Professor Amar has himself intuited.74 In
support, he notes that the supposedly more expert Florida Attorney
General’s office had resolved at least one statutory issue differently than
Harris did.75
Before swallowing this story, one should consider a couple of facts that
Professor Amar omits. Alas, the Florida Attorney General used the same
“dubious legal judgment,” if that is what it was, by serving as co-chairman
of Al Gore’s 2000 Florida election campaign.76 What’s more, even this
active Gore supporter gave an early warning that a recount like the one
eventually struck down in Bush v. Gore “will incur a legal jeopardy, under
both the U.S. and State constitutions.”77 So maybe the specter of Harris’
“severe partisanship” wasn’t so vivid after all.78 Or perhaps it just seemed
vivid to those who can perceive specters of partisanship only in
Republicans.
THE SECOND ARTICLE II RED HERRING
Professor Amar devotes another lengthy section of his lecture to
arguing that the Florida Legislature had no authority under Article II to
appoint a slate of electors in response to the uncertainty and delay created
by the ongoing recount litigation.79 No such appointment occurred, and the
70. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112–15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
71. Amar, supra note 1, at 957.
72. Amar, supra note 1, at 957.
73. Amar, supra note 1, at 957.
74. Amar, supra note 1, at 957.
75. Amar, supra note 1, at 957.
76. Don Van Natta Jr., Palm Beach Panel Votes to Proceed on Count, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2000, at A1.
77. Lund, Unbearable Rightness, supra note 6, at 1245–46 n.91 (quoting Letter from Robert
A. Butterworth, Attorney Gen., to Honorable Charles E. Burton, Chair, Palm Beach Canvassing
Board (Nov. 14, 2000)).
78. Amar, supra note 1, at 957.
79. Amar, supra note 1, at 957–60.
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issue has absolutely nothing to do with the Court’s decision in Bush v.
Gore.
Besides being a distraction, Professor Amar’s analysis is one-sided and
simplistic. There are obvious arguments to be made on both sides of the
question,80 and additional arguments might have been developed had the
question ever been litigated. Professor Amar also fails to acknowledge that
the Florida Legislature had good practical reasons for contemplating direct
appointment of an electoral slate. Federal law required the Electoral
College to meet on December 18,81 and the State of Florida could have lost
its right to participate in electing the President if electors had not been
appointed by then. The Florida Supreme Court, moreover, had found an
even earlier deadline (December 12) in Florida law,82 and that deadline
was rapidly approaching when some Florida legislators began to consider
direct appointment of electors.83 The pressure of time—invoked to excuse
what Professor Amar concedes was “a momentous mistake” by the Florida
Supreme Court84—somehow is forgotten when evaluating what legislators
merely considered doing if time actually ran out.
CONCLUSION
Professor Amar is a highly skilled rhetorician. In this very short
response, I have only touched on some of the more beguiling
misstatements, omissions, and distractors in his lecture. I do not expect to
persuade those who are consumed with disdain for Republicans, or Bush,
or “conservative” judges. But perhaps there is another audience, more
thoughtful and disciplined than the hippies called to mind by Professor
Amar’s apparent allusion to the 1960s musical Hair, with its celebration of
the Age of Aquarius.85 As we stand here at what Professor Amar calls “the
dawning of the Age of Obama,”86 there are many students and lawyers who
have encountered snippets of Bush v. Gore in a case book, along with
editorial comments from professors who have publicly excoriated the
Court and its decision. Perhaps some of these readers can be moved to take
a closer, and unprejudiced, look at the facts. They will find a story that
bears almost no resemblance to the one told by Professor Amar.

80. For a brief summary of arguments on both sides, see Lund, Unbearable Rightness, supra
note 6, at 1272–73 & n.167.
81. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
82. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1286 n.17, 1290 n.22
(Fla. 2000); Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1268 & n.30 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting); id.
at 1272 (Harding, J., dissenting).
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